


































































Any introduction to the topic of health and economic development is likely to begin with the
celebrated Preston curve, Preston (1975), which shows the cross-country relationship between
life-expectancy and income per head. Among the poorest countries, increases in average income
are strongly associated with increases in life expectancy but, as income per head rises, the
relationship flattens out, and is weaker or even absent among the richest countries. As Preston
noted, if such a nonlinear relationship holds within countries, countries with a more equal
distribution of income will have a higher average life-expectancy. The health of the rich is not
much affected by their income, so that transfers of income from rich to poor will improve the
average health of the nation. In recent work, this relationship between income inequality and
health has moved from being a supporting player in the story to center stage. Not only does
income equality promote health because income does more for the health of the poor, but it also
serves as a marker for other desirable features of society. According to this account, equal
societies have more social cohesion, more solidarity, and less stress, they offer their citizens
more social support and more social capital, and they satisfy humans’ evolved preference for
fairness. Equal societies are healthier, an argument that is the main topic of Wilkinson (1992,
1996, 2000), as well as the collection of papers edited by Kawachi, Kennedy, and Wilkinson
(1999).
This paper explores the theoretical and empirical basis for a connection between inequality
and health. I shall be concerned with poor as well as rich countries, and with the links between
health and income inequality at different levels of economic development. The proposition that
income inequality is a health risk was first proposed for the wealthy countries on the flatter upper2
part of the Preston curve, where chronic diseases have replaced infectious diseases as the main
cause of mortality. But as we shall see, many of the arguments that income inequality is a health
risk are as plausible for poor as for rich countries and in some cases, more so.
I devote a substantial fraction of the paper to theory, albeit illustrated with at least some of
the evidence. With a few exceptions, the literature does not specify the mechanisms through
which income inequality is supposed to affect health. In consequence, there is little guidance on
exactly what evidence we should be examining, or whether the propositions are refutable at all.
Section 2 lays out some of the possible stories, starting with the simple case in which health is
affected by income, and there is no direct effect of inequality. This is sometimes referred to us
the “absolute income hypothesis,” to emphasize that it is income that matters for health, not
income relative to other peoples’ incomes, nor income inequality. A name that would be at least
as good is the “poverty” hypothesis, that ill-health is a consequence of low income, in the sense
that more income improves health by more among those with low incomes than among those
with high incomes. It is important to start by establishing the full range of implications for this
simple case, and in particular what role is played by income inequality. I also discuss what
happens when we make health depend, not on absolute income, but relative income, and what the
relative income hypothesis implies for the relationship between health and inequality.
Other theoretical accounts concern the possible effects of income on investments in health
and education, the two-way link between nutrition and earnings at low levels of income, and the
possible negative effects of inequality on the ability of the political process to deliver public
goods. I also consider arguments that our evolutionary history predisposes us towards fairness,
and sickens us when live in unequal environments. Such an account can be made consistent with3
a story in which relative deprivation is a cause of ill health, and in which inequality is important
across groups, but not within them. I also briefly consider the link between inequality and crime.
Finally, I consider the important case in which income inequality is in part a consequence of ill-
health, so that policies that reduce the likelihood of sickness, shorten its duration, or ameliorate
its effects on earnings, can also narrow income inequalities. Some income inequality is a con-
sequence of the fact that earnings cannot be completely insured against ill-health, so that better
health insurance is likely to help reduce inequalities in income.
Section 3 turns to the evidence, most of which comes from developed economies. I review
cross-country studies on adult mortality for rich countries and on child mortality for both rich and
poor countries. A major question is whether the quality of the international data on income
distribution is of sufficiently high quality to support the inferences that are being made. Better
data, or at least more consistent data, are available within countries, and some of the most
interesting evidence on inequality and health comes from studies looking across areas within
developed countries, such as Britain, Canada, and the United States, and in a few poor countries.
I also review the evidence from studies that link individual mortality and morbidity to the
ambient level of income inequality. 
My tentative conclusion is that there is no direct link from income inequality to ill-health, in
the sense that individuals are no more likely to be sick or to die if they live in more unequal
places. The raw correlations that exist in (some of the) data are most likely the result of factors
other than income inequality, some of which are intimately linked to broader notions of
inequality or unfairness. The fact that income inequality itself is not a health risk does not mean
that inequalities more generally are not important, let alone that the social environment in which4
people live is irrelevant for their health. Indeed, I shall argue precisely the opposite. But we must
narrow and focus our search if we are to make the leap from correlation to policy.
In an attempt to address a relatively broad audience, I have kept the discussion as non tech-
nical as possible, replying on citations (and an Appendix) to provide formal demonstrations
whenever possible. In the few occasions where there are equations in the main text, I have
attempted to provide ample verbal explanation. The literature on income inequality and health is
already extensive, and I have tried to tell a coherent story rather than covering everything or
producing an annotated bibliography of the literature
2. Theoretical accounts of income inequality and health
2.1 Individual, group, and national health
2.1.1 Health, income and poverty
Most people find it intuitively plausible that the effects of income on health, if they exist at all,
should be greater among poor people than among the rich. Although there is a great deal of
evidence that the effect is not confined only to the poor, the intuition is supported by the evid-
ence. Figures 1 and 2 were calculated using data from the National Longitudinal Mortality
Survey in the US. This is a national follow-up study of about 1.3 million people (with about
three-quarters of a million people in the public release data) who were interviewed in Current
Population Surveys or in a census related sample around 1980, and whose deaths over a follow-
up period of 3,288 days were ascertained by matching to the National Death Index, see Rogot et
al (1992) for details. The survey collects each person’s family income (within one of seven
ranges) so that it is possible to link the probability of death during the follow-up to family5
income and other variables, the most important of which are sex and age. For adults between the
ages of 18 and 85, the log-odds of mortality is approximately linear in age, so a convenient way
to summarize the data is to estimate a logit model for the probability of death in which age is
entered linearly, together with a series of dummy variables for the age categories. The results are
shown in Figure 1, separately for white men and white women aged between 15 and 85 at the
time of the interview. This graph shows that, for both men and women, the log-odds of mortality
is approximately linear in the logarithm of family income. As a consequence, when we use the
results to plot the age-adjusted probability of death against income in Figure 2, we get the non-
linear curves as shown. That the curve for women appears less curved than the curve for men is
an insignificant consequence of the choice of scale.
The curves in Figure 2 illustrate the point first made by Preston (1975), though Preston’s data
were on countries, not people. The effect of income on reducing the probability of death at the
bottom of the income distribution—and the bottom circle is at about the 5
th percentile of family
income—is much greater than its effect at the top of the distribution. As a result, if income is
redistributed from the rich, whose health is not much affected, to the poor, whose health is more
responsive to income, average health will improve. Other things being equal, including average
income, nations (or other groups) with a more equal distribution of income will have better
average group health. The same is true internationally; anything that raises the GDP of poor
countries relative to that of rich countries will improve average health across the world. Within
poor countries, infant and child mortality is likely to be particularly sensitive to changes in
income near the bottom of the distribution so that, once again, redistribution towards the poor
will reduce child mortality even without raising average incomes.6
It is often useful to think of this story in terms of poverty. If a country with a high average
income has a great deal of income inequality, then there are a relatively large number of people
with low income whose health is poor. Although there is no poverty line in Figure 2, below
which income matters, and above which it does not, it is at the bottom of the income distribution
that the relationship between income and health really matters. And if a rich country has a lot of
poor people, it will have low average health relative to its per capita income. 
An important application of these ideas is provided by the history of mortality in Britain and
the US in the 20
th Century. Wilkinson (1989) looks at mortality differences by social class in
Britain from 1921 to 1981, and argues that mortality fell most rapidly at times when income
differentials were narrowed, particularly at times when incomes of the poor rose more rapidly
than those of the rich, such as during World War II. Sen (1999, Figures 2.2 and 2.3) shows how
life expectancy in England and Wales from 1901 to 1960 grew most rapidly in the decades
1911–21 (by 6.5 years) and 1940–51 (by 6.8 years), and more slowly at other times, 4 years in
1901–11, 2.4 years in 1921–31, 1.4 years in 1931–41, and 2.8 years in 1951–60. Sen shows that
the decadal rate of growth of GDP per capita is strongly negatively correlated with decadal
increases in life expectancy, and like Wilkinson, focuses on the degree of sharing during the two
wars, as well as on the direct nutritional and health interventions that took place during and
immediately after the second war. Both wars brought well-paying employment opportunities to
many people in Britain for the first-time, including many women. Hammond (1950) discusses
how wartime food policy in the 1940s brought fresh milk and vitamins to working people, even
to the extent that their nutritional status actually improved during the hostilities. Reductions in
income inequality during the wars, if they existed, marked an improvement in the conditions of7
the working people, among whom better incomes and better nutrition would have had the largest
effects on mortality.
As I shall argue in Section 3.5, it is not possible to link recent increases in income inequality
in the US and Britain to mortality changes. It should be noted, however, that recent increases in
income inequality, though large enough by postwar standards, are probably not large relative to
earlier compressions, particularly those associated with the World Wars, see Lindert (2000) and
Goldin and Katz (2001).
The inequality inducing effect of nonlinearity in the relationship between individual income
and individual health has come to be known in the literature as a “statistical artefact,” Gravelle et
al (1998), in order to distinguish it from mechanisms in which income inequality has a direct
effect on individual health. The term is unfortunate to the extent that it suggests there is no real
link between income inequality and health, and seems to carry the implication that redistributive
policy cannot improve average population health. By contrast, the effect of nonlinearity is so
plausible that it would be surprising if income redistribution did not improve average health, and
if there were no link between income inequality and average health across population aggregates.
2.1.2 Poverty, health and the effects of inequality at different income levels
The absolute income (or poverty) hypothesis tells us a good deal about how we can expect
average income and income inequality to affect population health at different levels of
development. At the most obvious, the effects of per capita income mirror those of individual
income, and become less important the richer is the country. Eventually, we would expect
income inequality to lose its effect too, but it is not enough that average income be high enough,8
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we also need everyone’s income to be high enough. The bottom tail of the income distribution
has to be pulled up beyond the point at which income has much effect on health. Before that,
there will still be poverty even in rich countries, so that income inequality will still matter as well
as average income. In consequence, the absolute income or poverty hypothesis implies that,
among the poorest countries, average income is what matters for population health, and income
inequality is relatively less important. Among rich countries, average income is less important,
and income inequality relatively more important. Eventually, neither will matter much for
population health but, under plausible assumptions, the effect of income inequality relative to
that of average income continues to grow as countries become richer. These implications of the
absolute income hypothesis are important because it is often claimed that the differential effects
of average income and income inequality on health are as described, and that the observation
helps establish the case for a direct effect of inequality on health. While the finding it is certainly
consistent with such an effect, it is also consistent with a simple model in which income has a
larger effect on health among the poor.
The rest of this subsection is devoted to demonstrating the claim in the last paragraph in the
context of a simple illustrative model. A more realistic case is developed in the Appendix. I
assume that health is a quadratic function of income. Suppose that individual i lives in country s,
and that her health   is a quadratic function of her family income   so that if, for convenience, his yis
I write everything relative to worldwide means, signified by overbars, we have
(Note that equation (1) could be rewritten as a linear relationship between health, income and
income squared, though the parameters would have to be redefined.) Income promotes health, but9
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by less for the rich, so that both  and  are positive. Equation (1) is assumed to hold true
everywhere, for all individuals, whether or not they live in poor or rich countries, and wherever
they are in the epidemiological transition. To find out what happens to the country means, we
have to average equation (1) across all i in each country s. When the last term on the right-hand
side is averaged, it gives a term in the squared deviation of average income from the global
average, plus the variance within each country. Looking across countries, (1) then becomes
where variables subscripted by s are population means, and   is the variance of income in vs
country s, which, in this context, is the natural inequality measure. Equations (1) and (2) demon-
strate the essential point that, provided the individual equation is nonlinear, which in this case
means that the parameter  is not zero, the inequality of income matters in the aggregate relation-
ship (2), even though it plays no part in the individual relationship (1).
These equations also allow us to be precise about the links between health, average income,
and income inequality, and to see how those links change with income. The effect of average
income on average health is the derivative of (2) with respect to   which is  ys,   2( ys  ¯ y )
which, since  is positive, gets smaller as average income increases. The effect of inequality on
population health is (minus) the parameter  (inequality makes average health worse) which is
constant. As a result, as a country becomes richer and average income rises, the effect on
population health of income inequality becomes more important relative to the effect on
population health of average income. Even when income is large enough for the effect of average
income to be zero, the effect of inequality remains constant.10
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2.1.3 Separating the aggregation effect from the direct effect
One use of the curves in Figure 2 is to calculate how income inequality can be expected to affect
mortality across aggregates of people, such as cities, states, or whole countries. This allows a
direct link to be drawn from the degree of curvature of the income-mortality relationship in the
individual data to the role of income inequality in explaining group mortality. Such calculations
have been done by Wolfson et al (1998), also using the NLMS data, who then go on to show that
the effects predicted by the nonlinearity are insufficient to explain the actual relationship between
income inequality and mortality across the US states. But it turns out that it is not strictly neces-
sary to go back to the individual data, and that it is often possible to calculate the effects of the
aggregation from the grouped data themselves. This is important, because it gives us a way of
telling whether the effects of inequality at the group level can be explained through the nonlinear
effects of income alone, or whether we have evidence of a direct effect of inequality at the indi-
vidual level.
The result is due to Miller (2000), who points out that the shape of the curve in the individual
data is carried through to the aggregate data, albeit with additional terms in inequality, so that any
additional effects of inequality due to a direct effect on individual health can be observed using
only the aggregate data. Again, the quadratic case illustrates the point. Suppose that for indivi-
dual i in state s, equation (1) holds as before, with the addition of a direct negative effect of
inequality on health. We can write this as
The presence of   in the individual equation represents a pure effect of inequality on individual vs
health, whose size depends on the parameter . When we average (3) over all individuals in state11
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s, we again get equation (2), but with the additional variance term carried through,
In equation (4), the variance term appears from the aggregation, through the parameter , but also
through the “direct” effect of inequality on health, the parameter . But because the quadratic
term appears in the state level relationship (4) just as it does in the individual relationships (1) or
(3), we can estimate  from the aggregate data by looking at the quadratic term in (4). Given ,
the parameter  can be recovered by subtraction, so that the aggregate data are potentially
informative about whether the effect of inequality is an aggregation effect, or something else.
2.1.4 Relative income, absolute income, and inequality
Individual health is affected by many things other than individual income, and it is possible that
the relationship between health and income itself is spurious, with income standing proxy for
some other variable. An obvious candidate for such a variable is education; if conditional on
education, income has no effect on health, redistributive taxes that narrow the distribution of
income will have no effect on health. In the US, the relationship between income and mortality is
not much affected by controlling for education, Elo and Preston (1998), Deaton and Paxson
(2001a), but there are few other studies or data sets that would allow us to come to general
conclusions about the separate roles of income and education.
Even if income is the crucial variable, it is possible that health is determined, not by absolute
income, but by income relative to some aspiration level, or relative to the incomes of others.
Easterlin (1975) long ago found evidence that happiness is independent of income in the long-
run, and health may follow the same pattern. That health depends on income relative to average12
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incomes of one or more reference groups is the relative income hypothesis. This could happen in
a number of different ways. One case is where relative income determines access to material
goods, for example when the people who live in a town are the market for local land for housing,
with the richest getting the hilltop plots with fine views, and the poorest getting the plots
downwind of the smokestacks, see Gaarder (2000) who argues that this is one mechanism that
sets who gets exposed to air pollution. The local housing case is an example where it is not
money itself that is important, but rank, here determined by money. More generally, rank is
important in determining how much control people have over their lives, particularly at work
and, as demonstrated in the Whitehall studies, the degree of such control is an important
contributor to health.
The relative income theory is consistent with an effect of income inequality, although it does
not imply it. To see how things might work out, suppose that, as before, individuals are labeled i,
but that we use s to index the relevant comparison or reference group. An individual’s health
might then be above or below the population mean depending on whether her income is above or
below the average income in the reference group. Hence, with  positive, we might write
For the group as a whole, group average health   is just average health   which is the same for hs ¯ h,
all groups, so that neither group income nor group income inequality has any effect on group
health. This annihiliation of the effect of income on health as we move from the individual to the
group will always happen if the reference group is within the unit over which we are aggregating.
For example, if reference groups are geographically local, average income will be unrelated to
average health at the region, province, or state level. Such an account offers one explanation for13
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why income might be related to health within groups, but not between them.
The relative income story is also consistent with a role for income inequality at the group
level, and the mechanism is the same as for the absolute income hypothesis, the nonlinearity of
the relationship between income, now relative income, and health. Again, an obvious example is
provided by the quadratic version of equation (5), in which individual health depends on income
relative to group income and the square of income relative to group income:
When we average health over individuals within each group, the first term vanishes, as before,
while the second term becomes the variance of income, 
This provides us with one account of what several researchers have observed, that within states
or countries, individual health is related to individual income, while between them, average
health is independent of average income but is negatively related to income inequality. In Sub-
section 2.5 below, I present another formulation that has similar properties.
2.1.5 The impossibility of identifying reference groups
An immediate problem with the implementation of any model of relative income is the identi-
fication of the relevant reference group. In a few cases, such as Whitehall, the reference group (or
at least what is likely people’s most important reference group) is a ready-made part of the
design. More usually, reference groups are not clearly defined, and indeed people will often have
multiple such groups, comparing themselves to their neighbors, to their co-workers, to those they
meet in social and religious organizations, and to those they see on television or read about in14
newspapers. One way of dealing with this is to recognize that reference group incomes cannot be
observed, and to work out the effects of the omission on the relationship between the two things
that we can observe, health and income. As shown in Deaton (2001), this procedure brings
inequality back into the story even when it has no direct role.
Figure 3 illustrates for the simple case where there are two groups, labeled “economists” (on
the left) and “doctors” on the right. Income is measured on the horizontal axis, health on the
vertical axis. The two ellipses show where economists and doctors are located in terms of their
health and incomes. One can think of individuals in each group as scattered within the two
elliptical areas. Doctors have higher incomes than economists, and within each group, individual
health depends on individual income relative to other members of the group. The two parallel
steep lines show the relationships between income and health for each of the two groups.
Although doctors have higher incomes than economists, their individual health is no better on
average because their absolute income does not matter, only their income relative to other
members of their group. Suppose that an epidemiologist analyzes the data on economists’ and
doctors’ health, but without knowing which is which. When the data are pooled, the relationship
between health and income is the flatter, broken line. By mixing the two groups, omitting the
relevant information on group, the relationship is “attenuated” or flattened out.
Inequality comes into this story because the degree of flattening depends on ratio of within-
group income inequality to between-group income inequality. This is easy to see in the Figure. If
doctors and economists are moved further apart, by moving the two ellipses horizontally away
from each other, the broken line will become flatter , i.e. more attenuated. If the within group
inequality is increased, holding between group difference fixed, so that the ellipses are stretched15
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out along their individual income to health lines, the broken line will become steeper, increasing
the gradient between income and health. The steepness of the gradient depends positively on the
ratio of within to between group inequality. For example, in Whitehall, if there is only one
reference group, that of British civil servants, the gradient of health with respect to income (or
rank) is likely to be steeper than in a study containing a mixture of indistinguishable reference
groups. More generally, if health depends on relative, not absolute income, and there is an
increase in income inequality that increases inequality within groups more than it increases it
between groups, the slope of the gradient will increase.
In Deaton (2001), I show that if health depends on relative income as in equation (5), so that
where   is a random term that ensures that there is a scatter around the line, then the expectation is
of health conditional on individual income takes the form:





2.2 Inequality, education, health, and economic growth
The literature on economic development has recently re-examined the links between inequality
and growth. In the past, economists have often thought that income inequality would be good for
growth. One mechanism works through saving. If only the rich save, and if saving finances
investment for growth, redistribution towards the rich will be growth enhancing. More generally,
the disincentive effects of redistributive taxes are themselves likely to inhibit initiative, entre-16
preneurship, and risk-taking, and thus to lower output and discourage growth. The recent
literature has explored a number of mechanisms that operate in the other direction, and several of
these are relevant to the argument here, or can be adapted to be relevant. I draw in particular on
the useful survey articles by Benabou (1996) and Aghion et al (1999); see also Bertola (2000),
Bardhan, Bowles, and Gintis (2000) and Galor and Moav (2000).
In an economy where everyone can borrow and lend without restriction, each person’s
investment should not be restricted by each person’s own resources. If someone has an invest-
ment opportunity that can be expected to earn a good rate of return, it should be undertaken; the
money needed to fund it will be earned by the investment, with profit left over. If the person with
the idea, or with the ability to carry out the project lacks the funds to do so, he or she can borrow
money, paying it back as the project pays off. If we think of investments as construction projects,
building a factory or a bridge, the financial standing of the investor will indeed often not be
relevant. But if we are thinking of investments in education (human capital) or health (health
capital), matters may be different, and the lack of access to borrowing on reasonable terms may
prevent many poor people from making profitable investments in themselves or in their children.
The inability to borrow is likely to afflict the poor more than the rich; for one thing, the poor do
not have other assets that can be used as collateral. In consequence, redistribution of income—or
of assets, such as land—from rich to poor may increase levels of education and health. Education
promotes health—Elo and Preston (1996) estimate that, around the world, a year of extra
education reduces mortality rates by about 8 percent—so that redistribution will improve average
health, both directly and indirectly.
Even when loans are available in principle, many parents may be unwilling to take the risk of17
borrowing substantial sums of money for their children’s education. Although the investments
may be profitable on average, not all will be, and not all children will be either willing or able to
help their parents repay the loans taken out in their behalf. Some poor parents will simply not be
willing to take the risk. Once again, redistribution may increase investment in health and in
schooling.
It is also possible that even some better-off people are unwilling to borrow much to educate
their children, or to go deeply into debt for expensive medical care. If so, redistribution of
income or of assets from rich to poor may reduce health and educational investment among the
rich almost as much as it increases them among the poor. Even so, redistribution may promote
growth if the returns to investment are higher among the poor than among the rich. If poor people
rarely finish primary school, and if rich people usually finish college, and if the rate of return,
either in future earnings or in subsequent health, is higher to an additional year of elementary
school, (Schultz, 1991, Strauss and Thomas, 1998) the redistribution from rich to poor will
increase the rate of return to education as a whole, increasing both growth and average health. A
similar story may hold for girls’ education, which may have a higher or lower rate of return in
earnings than boys’ education, but certainly has a higher rate of return in terms of health.
Figure 4 shows relevant data on education for rural India, see Filmer and Pritchett (1999) for
related evidence for a wide range of countries. The 52
nd Round of the National Sample Survey
collected data in 1995–96 on education enrolment and status of respondents. The graph shows
the percentage of boys and girls aged from 7 to 12 (inclusive) that are currently enrolled in school
as a function of the logarithm of total household expenditure per head, a measure of overall
living standards in the household in which the child resides. The graphs are calculated using non-18
parametric regression using 20,307 boys and 17,321 girls aged 7 to 12. Boys are more likely to be
in school than girls, both are more likely to be in school when they live in better-off households,
and the effects of additional resources are larger for girls than for boys. Although the slopes of
the curve vary somewhat with per capita expenditure, they are clearly flatter to the right. In
consequence, redistribution from richer to poorer households will increase the total percentage of
children in school, and will increase girls’ enrolment more than boys’. Because education is an
input into both health and production, and because the rate of return to education is higher at
lower than at higher levels of education, and higher for girls than for boys, the positive effects of
redistribution will be further enhanced
Figure 5 shows some contrasting data on child vaccinations from the same Indian survey. As
was the case for school enrolment, the fractions of children under 5 who have all three of the
most important vaccinations is lower for poor than for rich households. However, unlike
education, the slope is almost as steep among better-off than among poorer households, so that
this graph indicated no major effect of redistributing income on raising child vaccination rates.
Nor is there any great difference between vaccination rates between boys and girls.
These examples are only suggestive. The curves in Figures 4 and 5 make no attempt to
control for other factors—such as parental education, school quality or health service provision—
that are likely to be positively correlated with both household income and the outcome, so that
the effects of income are almost certainly overstated. Nevertheless, the graphs illustrate that
income redistribution may (or may not) increase health and educational investments in children.19
2.3 Nutritional wages, destitution, and land-holdings
The nutritional wage model provides an elegant and rigorous account of how inequality affects
both health and earnings while explicitly recognizing that health and earnings are simultaneously
determined. The ideas go back to Leibenstein (1957), with the fundamental work by Mirrlees
(1975) and Stiglitz (1976). An excellent and still useful survey of the field is Bliss and Stern
(1978). That nutritional wage models can account for persistent poverty and destitution in poor
countries is eloquently argued in Dasgupta and Ray (1986), (1987) and Dasgupta (1993); an
excellent textbook summary is provided by Ray (1998, Chapter 13).
An important insight of the nutritional wage story is that poor workers, at risk of under-
nourishment, may not be able to earn enough to buy the food that would sustain the work
required. If this nutritional trap is to be avoided, two conditions must be satisfied. The first is
physiological; the worker must consume enough calories to be able to do undertake whatever
work he or she does for wages, as well as to sustain basic metabolism and resting bodily
functions. The second condition comes from the market; the wages from earnings must be
sufficient to buy the calories consumed. But these two conditions are not necessarily mutually
compatible, especially when wage rates are low. At such wages, there may be no combination of
work and calories that satisfies both the physiological and market conditions. In this situation,
there is a critical wage rate that just enables the worker to work and survive. For any wage rate
below it, long-term survival is not possible by working in the labor market.
The existence of this critical wage seriously disrupts the usual analysis of supply and demand
in the labor market. Employers demand labor in the usual way and are prepared to employ more
labor the lower is the market wage. Provided the wage rate is high enough, above the critical20
point, higher wages elicit more labor from workers in the usual way. However, when wages are
lower than the critical level, there is no labor supply, because workers can no longer obtain
enough calories to do the work. As a result, if the demand for labor is less than its supply at the
critical wage, the resulting unemployment cannot be eliminated by decreasing the wage rate to
bring supply and demand into balance. The surplus workers are unemployed, and worse than that,
must live on whatever they can beg or come by without working. They are chronically under-
nourished, and cannot undercut those in work by offering to work for less because, at any lower
wage, they will not be well-enough nourished to be useful to potential employers.
What are the solutions to the destitution produced by such a labor market? One possibility is
to find a way of providing nutrition outside of the labor market, so that even at a low wage rate,
the worker will have enough food to work. This will happen if basic nutritional needs can be met
without having to work for wages, for example by growing food on the worker’s own plot of
land. Seen this way, the problem of destitution is a problem of landlessness, and can be resolved
by redistribution of land so as to give to every family a small plot that is sufficient to guarantee
their basic needs, and to enable them to participate gainfully in the labor market. Destitution is
therefore a problem of maldistribution and its solution is a more equitable distribution of land. 
The nutritional explanation of destitution and chronic malnutrition in India by Dasgupta and
Ray is echoed by Fogel’s (1994) account of the economic and health history of Europe. He
argues that, even at the end of the eighteenth century in England and France, food production was
so low that, given its likely distribution over people, perhaps a fifth of the population was
capable of no more than a few hours of light work each day. These people were chronically
malnourished, short in stature, and in life expectancy. Only the increase in agricultural product-21
ivity in the nineteenth century permitted an escape from this nutritional trap, and the beginning of
the transition to better health, lower mortality, and lengthening life-expectancy.
The story of nutrition and wages has much to commend it. Unlike most other accounts, it
directly confronts the two-way causality between health and earnings. It also provides a general
equilibrium explanation of unemployment and poor health that has an obvious relevance to poor
countries now as well as to the historical record in now rich countries. It also pinpoints land
reform as a policy prescription. And for our immediate purpose, it identifies the inequality of
land holding as a cause of malnourishment and poor health.
Yet the theory has many critics who doubt its descriptive realism and fault its implications,
see in particular Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984), Rosenzweig (1991, 720–28) and Strauss
and Thomas (1998). Workers who are trapped by their low nutrition and inability to work would
devote all their energies to finding food, and would have no energy for consuming anything other
than food, for saving, or even for procreation, Gersovitz (1983). Wage rates appear to be flexible
downward, which the theory says is impossible. Even in the poorest economies, food is typically
too cheap relative to the wage rate to make the trap plausible. For example, Subramanian and
Deaton (1994) calculate that in rural Maharashtra in 1983, 2,000 calories (in the form of standard
coarse cereals) could be purchased for less than 5 percent of the day wage, a finding that is
consistent with the observation that poor agricultural workers in India typically eat their fill of
cheap calories at the end of the work day, see also Swamy (1997). With food so cheaply obtain-
able, nutritional wage traps seem too easy to escape.
More broadly, the model does not draw a clear distinction between nutrition, which comes
from the food that can be bought for money, and nutritional status, which depends on disease as22
well as on nutritional inputs. A plentiful supply of food will not nourish someone whose drinking
water and food are contaminated, and chronic malnutrition typically needs to be addressed
through public health measures as well as by increasing the supply of food. This criticism
applies, not only to the nutritional wage theory as an account of destitution in poor countries, but
also to McKeown (1976) and Fogel’s (1994) arguments about the historical importance of nutri-
tion, see particularly Preston (1996).
2.4 Inequality, politics, and public goods
It is often argued that inequality may make it more difficult for people to agree on the provision
of public goods, such as health, water supply, waste disposal, education and police. Such
mechanisms have long been recognized in the literature on political economy, and a simple
formal account has recently been provided by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999). The story is
one of a local community whose members want to provide a public good, and who must decide
how much to spend. A useful way to think of this is to imagine the members of the community
evenly spaced out in a circular town, with a clinic to be built in the center. The radius of the
town—or the size of the community—is a metaphor for inequality; in equal communities all live
close to the center, while in unequal ones, the members are on average much further from the
middle. The value of the clinic to each person diminishes with their distance from the center, so
that the people at the edge of town value it less than those who live in the middle. The average
(or median) value of the clinic is therefore higher the more compact is the community. If the size
of the clinic is decided by voting, more specifically by the wishes of the median voter, a larger
clinic will be built in the more compact town, because the median value of the clinic to its users23
is higher. More generally, when people’s preferences are heterogeneous, goods held in common
are less valued on average, and fewer of them will be provided.
Although they note the potential application to income inequality, Alesina, Baqir, and East-
erly think of their model as applying to racial divisions in the United States, and to ethnic
fractionalization more widely, a variable that often appears to have negative consequences in
cross-country growth studies. In the context of the cities and counties of the US examined by
Alesina et al, ethnic fractionalization is closely related to the fraction of the population that is
black, which is positively related to total spending, but negatively related to the shares in
spending of “productive” public goods, such as health, roads, and education. For health, the total
effect offsets the share effect, so that the absolute amount of health spending is positively
associated with fractionalization. Income inequality is included in the models, although the
results are not presented in the paper. However, I understand from private communication with
one of the authors that the effects vary from model to model and that there are no robust negative
effects of inequality on either total spending or its distribution. It should also be noted that
Putnam and his collaborators (1983), in their study of social capital in Italy, also see equality as
an important element of the civic community.
While I know of no work in developing countries that links the provision of public health
resources to income inequality, Szreter (1988) has provided a fascinating account of politics and
sanitation in Britain in the middle of the 19
th century, see also Easterlin (1999). The urbanization
of population associated with the industrial revolution led to a sharp reduction in public health,
with mortality higher in cities than in the countryside, and a decline in overall life expectancy.
Urban populations often had no access to clean water, and no facilities for disposal of human and24
other wastes, which were allowed to accumulate as a perpetual hazard to health. Crowding aided
the transmission of infectious diseases, some of which can only be sustained in populations
above a critical size. Pollution from smoke and other factory discharges contaminated the atmos-
phere and the environment. Yet many cities, in Britain and in Europe, were slow to address these
problems, even when the necessary policies were well understood. Although the germ theory of
disease was generally accepted only after 1870, earlier explanations, such as the “miasma”
theory, also emphasized the importance of cleaning up the environment. And while money is
always a factor limiting public construction, these were periods of relatively rapid economic
growth. Indeed, the coexistence of rapid economic growth and mortality increase (as well as a
decrease in stature) during this period is regarded as something of a puzzle by economic
historians, see Haines and Kintner (1999), Schofeld and Reher (1991) and Fogel (1996), who are
typically so confident of the link between health and incomes that they often use measures of the
former—such as stature—as reliable indicators of the latter, Steckel (1994).
Szreter (1988) argues that the key to understanding the mortality transition in England lies is
local politics. Although the industrializing cities were in fact well supplied with fresh water, it
was used for commercial purposes, not supplied to homes. And the new entrepreneurial class,
rich though they were, saw no point in spending each others’ money for public sanitation which
had no obvious commercial benefit. It was only after political reform, and particularly the limited
political emancipation of working men, that new political coalitions could develop that made
sanitation and public health a priority.
This is a story of 19
th Century England, not of the world today, and it is about politics, not
about income inequality. Yet central to the plot are the Reform Acts and their (limited) extension25
of democracy which may or may not have (directly) reduced income inequality, but certainly
reduced political inequality. This increase in equality was not only valuable in its own right, it
subsequently helped reduce other inequalities, in health, and perhaps eventually in incomes, in
accord with the general thesis of Sen (1999). In a more contemporary context, it is hard not to see
political action, or at least the lack of it, as one of the reasons behind the low level of provision of
schools and clinics in Indian villages. Chattopadhyay and Duflo’s (2001) work in India shows
how the mandated representation of women as leaders of village councils (in a randomly selected
third of all Indian villages) has led to small but perceptible gains in public goods important to
women and children, particularly water, fuel, and roads (whose construction provides employ-
ment opportunities for women) though, perhaps surprisingly, male leaders invest more in
education.
2.5 Evolution, equality, and relative deprivation.
2.5.1 Evolution, stress, and inequality
It might easily be supposed that hierarchic, unequal societies are an inevitable part of the human
condition. Yet for the vast majority of our evolutionary history, humans lived in hunter-gatherer
groups that were not only not hierarchic, but aggressively egalitarian, Erdal and Whiten (1991).
As has long been argued, perhaps first by McKeown (1976, 1979), human health is maximized
when we live under the conditions under which we evolved, pursuing regular exercise (walking
10 to 15 miles a day, as foragers and hunters did), and eating low fat, low-salt, low-meat, sugar-
free, high fibre, largely vegetarian diets. By the same token, given that hierarchies and social
inequalities were unknown for most of our history, modern inequalities are likely to be a hazard26
to our health. This argument is forcefully and eloquently put by Wilkinson (2000).
That foraging groups were egalitarian appears to be widely agreed. Such arrangements could
perhaps have come from lack of a technology for storing food. When a kill has been made, and
the meat is too much to be consumed at once, sharing and subsequent reciprocity are the only
mechanisms that can turn meat today into meat tomorrow. Members of groups that used such
mechanisms would therefore have a survival advantage over members of those who did not, so
that a preference for sharing, fairness and reciprocation may be evolved attributes. With the
invention of settled agriculture, with the associated ability to fill and hold food in granaries, as
well as to build herds of animals, egalitarian and reciprocal sharing was less efficient, and could
give way to hierarchies within which rich and powerful individuals could dominate others.
Although such systems and their industrial successors are vastly more productive than is
foraging, the benefits come at the price of a nagging and health-compromising outrage over the
loss of equality. And while humans will perhaps evolve to suit this new environment, we have
only given up foraging for a very short time, only 50,000 or so years of our perhaps million-year
history. Adaptation to the new environment has its benefits, in terms of production, longevity,
health, and population size, but it has a lingering cost that prevents our health from reaching its
full potential.
Wilkinson and others have begun to weave together a plausible story of the processes that
support such an account. Psychosocial stress is the main pathway through which inequality
affects health. Wilkinson draws a contrast between societies in which relationships “are
structured by low-stress affiliative strategies which foster social solidarity” on the one hand, and
societies characterized by “much more stressful strategies of dominance, conflict and submission.27
Which social strategy predominates is mainly determined by how equal or unequal a society is.”
(Wilkinson, 2000, p. 4). Equality is seen as a precondition for the existence of stress-reducing
networks of friendships, while inequality and relative deprivation are seen as compromising
individual dignity, and promoting shame and violence. At the same time the biological mechan-
isms through which chronic stress compromises health are beginning to be understood; excellent
surveys can be found in Sapolsky (1998), Brunner and Marmot (1999) and Wilkinson (2000,
Chapter 2.)
2.5.2 Income inequality and relative deprivation
The story outlined above is persuasive in many respects. That the social environment in which
we live helps determine our health is surely right, and the effects of psychosocial stress are now
well-documented in both human (particularly Whitehall civil servant) and animal populations.
Yet it is less clear why income inequality is the only, or even the prime villain in the piece. I have
made an attempt to explain why it might be so in Deaton (2001). In this account, I treat income
relative to other members of a reference group as the key variable, and hypothesize that stress on
each individual is proportional to the total amount of income accruing to community members
with higher incomes, expressed in units of group mean income. Figure 6 illustrates. It shows the
cumulative distribution,  , of income x for the reference group, and calculates the mortality F(x)
risk, on the vertical axis, for a person with income x, on the horizontal axis. This person is hurt
by all the incomes of the people above him, to the right of x. Consider one such person, with
income y. The burden that the people around y place on x is in proportion to their distance above
x, or the distance   so that for the group in the strip from y to   the contribution to the yx, ydy,28
mortality risk of someone with income x is the shaded area, which is the product of the number
of people, dF(y), and the income difference   The same sort of effect operates for all yx.
incomes above x, so that the total risk is the total area above the curve from point A up to the
highest income.
This area, divided by the mean of group income, was proposed by Yitzhaki (1979) as a
measure of relative deprivation, a term frequently used by Wilkinson in his discussions of social
stress. Although the meaning here is more specialized (and precise) than that intended by
Wilkinson, the formalization appears to be well-chosen, in that it generates many of the effects
that he proposes. If relative deprivation is drawn as a function of income, we get curves like
those in Figure 7, drawn for a selection of states in the U.S. The theory can be tested by matching
these curves to the relationship between mortality and income for each state.
The measure of relative deprivation defined above and illustrated in Figures 6 and 7 has a
number of interesting properties. First, relative deprivation, and thus mortality risk, is lower for
people with higher income. Second, the rate at which relative deprivation declines with income is
lower at higher incomes. This convex shape is then consistent with the relationship between
mortality risk and income that we find in data such as the NLMS, and which is illustrated in
Figure 2. Third, the amount of relative deprivation at any given level of income depends on the
amount of income inequality in the group. Indeed, the amount of relative deprivation for some-
one with mean income is itself an inequality index, the relative mean deviation, sometimes called
the Pietra or Robin Hood index. More unequal “states” in Figure 7, like the District of Columbia
and California, have higher relative deprivation curves than Maine or Florida, where income is
more equally distributed. Fourth, if we average relative deprivation over all the members of the29
group, so as to get group mortality risk, we get another measure of inequality, the gini coefficient.
This conforms almost exactly to Wilkinson’s (1998) statement that “income inequality summa-
rizes the health burden of individual relative deprivation.”
In summary, the relative deprivation theory of mortality risk has three important implications:
(i) within groups, mortality risk is a convex and declining function of income; (ii) conditional on
an individual’s relative income, inequality matters for individual health; and (iii) for groups,
mortality risk is independent of group income, but is directly related to the gini coefficient. The
results of testing this theory are postponed to Section 3, where they can be presented in the
context of other, related work on mortality differences across the US states.
2.6 Inequality and crime
Crime is often treated as a public health issue. This is clearly appropriate in the case of homicide
or other crimes against persons, but there is also a great deal of violence and stress associated
with other crimes, such as theft or drug dealing. Much of the work on crime and inequality is
unabashedly empirical, but there is some theory to provide guidance. The seminal paper on the
economics of crime is Becker (1968), who proposed that criminal activity should be seen as the
outcome of an optimal choice in which the expected benefits of crime, money from theft, or the
satisfaction of murdering an enemy, are weighed against the expected costs, including the costs
of legitimate activity foregone, as well as the costs of punishment weighted by the probability of
apprehension. Criminals are no different from everyone else so that we would all be criminals
given the right incentives. Becker’s theory was used by Ehrlich (1973) to examine crime rates
across the states of the US, who then needed an operational measure of the benefits of crime30
relative to the opportunity cost in terms of legitimate activity in the labor market. Ehrlich argued
that the benefit of theft is likely to be related to average (median) community income or wealth.
Because only those with low incomes, and thus low opportunity cost of legitimate activity, were
likely to find the benefits of crime greater than the costs, Ehrlich included in his regression the
fraction of the population whose incomes were below half median state income, calling this a
measure of income inequality. (It would more usually be thought of as a poverty measure.)
In general, there is no reason to suppose that only the poor will commit crimes. Instead, we
might model the net benefit of a contemplated crime for person A against person B as propor-
tional to the income difference between them. If so, the incentive for person A to commit a crime
is proportional to the sum of all such income differences above him, which takes us back to the
measure of relative deprivation proposed in the previous subsection. Within any community, the
average of such incentives over all people is simply the gini coefficient of income, a result that
might have been approached directly by noting that the gini coefficient is the ratio to the mean of
(half the) the average of all income differences between people. If the rate of apprehension and
mean income is the same in all communities, it would therefore be plausible that higher inequal-
ity communities would show higher crime rates.
The probability of apprehension will generally depend on the level of crime, which may
obscure any simple relationship with income inequality. Indeed, as Wittenberg (2000) shows, the
interaction of crime and crime prevention can generate multiple equilibria, including outcomes
where there is a great deal of inequality, but very little crime. When the potential victims are rich
enough to make attractive targets, they may also be rich enough to afford extensive security
measures. Whites in apartheid South Africa were well protected against the crime that might31
have been expected given the extraordinary levels of income inequality between them and the
Black majority population. At the other end of the spectrum, murder is common among hunter-
gatherer bands precisely because, in these egalitarian structures there is no central control, no
hierarchic structure, and no police. 
One might also challenge the basic premise of Becker’s analysis, that criminals are no
different from the rest of us, but simply face different costs and benefits. That everyone will turn
to crime given sufficient incentives may be doubted, as in Sen’s vehement denial that inequality
leads to crime, “crime needs some assertion and confidence and you can’t do it when you are
down on your knees. It has been seen that even during famines, which are periods of massive
inequality, there is no increase in crime. I have seen the Bengal famine, and even there, people
would die outside sweet shops, but not a glass would be broken,” Business Standard (2001).
Nevertheless, as we shall see in Section 3, the data often show a quite robust correlation
between homicide and inequality.
2.7 Income inequality as a consequence of ill-health
It is clear that not only does economic status influence health status, but also that health status
affects economic status. Unfortunately, and with the notable exception of the nutritional wage
model, the literature has tended to concentrate on one or other direction of causality, without
paying enough attention to the interaction between the two, something that deserves serious study
in its own right. At low levels of income and nourishment, the effects of disease and food (mean-
ing income) should not be thought about separately. Inadequate nourishment compromises the
immune system and makes it less able to resist infection; ensuring adequate income is likely to32
be important even for a strategy that focuses mainly on public health. At the same time, although
income may be sufficient to guarantee adequate nutrition, nutrition will not improve nutritional
status if the body is unable to absorb the food because of chronic diarrhea or intestinal infection.
The provision of public health measures, clean water and waste disposal, is necessary even for a
strategy that focuses mainly on growth and income. Even more obviously, and in rich countries
as well as poor, the ability to work is compromised by ill-health. People with low incomes may
be more likely to contract a disease, they are less able to spend money to mitigate its consequ-
ences, and they may find it difficult to comply with complex and time-intensive medical regimes
or to seek medical attention in the first place.
When interactions are important, the distribution of income will depend on the distribution of
health. Any measure that reduces the spread of health conditions across the population will
narrow the distribution of income. In particular, anything that helps people recover more rapidly
from an illness will reduce the persistence of ill-health, which reduces the long-term variance of
health across the population. Better insurance arrangements, or better and more widespread
clinics are obvious candidates to reduce such persistence, and so will not only improve popula-
tion health (if they work at all), but also improve the distribution of income. Clean water, whose
lack affects the poor more than the rich, will improve the incomes of the poor relative to the rich,
and reduce income inequality. Malaria eradication campaigns and vaccination drives will have
the same effect, not only improving population health, but also narrowing the distribution of
income. This would be true even in a Lewis world in which there is an unlimited supply of labor
at the subsistence wage. Better health may not improve the wage rate, and cannot do so under the
Lewis assumption, but it can enable more people to work at that wage.33
Income differences between countries are also affected by their differences in population
health. In consequence, the speed at which new health technology is transmitted from the
industrialized to developing countries narrows their relative population healths as well as their
relative incomes, see Sachs (2001). Current debates about international pricing of drugs and
patent protection are important in this context. Whether the faster transmission of drugs and
vaccines will improve the distribution of income within poor countries depends on the prevalence
of disease within the income distribution. For AIDS, prevalence in poor countries is (still) higher
among the rich, while for malaria or tuberculosis, prevalence is higher among the poor. In the
past, health innovations have often widened health inequalities when first introduced; examples
are better sanitation a century or more ago, Preston and Haines (1991), tobacco and lung cancer
more recently, and child health improvements in contemporary Brazil, Victora et al (2000).
Faster transmission of best-practice healthcare may therefore widen the income distribution
within the receiving countries, at least in the first instance.
3. Empirical evidence on inequality and health
3.1 Measuring income inequality
Income inequality is not an easy thing to measure so that, before looking at the evidence on the
effects of inequality, it is worth starting with a discussion of what we know about inequality
itself. There are both conceptual and practical issues. Comprehensive treatments of the theory of
inequality measurement were developed in the 1970s by Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973), the
latter updated in Foster and Sen (1999). Although there are a number of axioms on the nature of
inequality that are broadly accepted, these will not always be sufficient to permit us to make34
unambiguous inequality rankings between any two distributions of income. Instead, the axioms
induce a “partial ordering” whereby we can sometimes rank one distribution as more unequal
while, in other cases, we can judge the inequality of distributions only by choosing a specific
inequality measure, with different measures giving different results. In particular, different
inequality measures give a different emphasis to different parts of the distribution. For example,
the gini coefficient is more sensitive to inequality (or to measurement error) at the top of the
income distribution, whereas measures that work with the logarithms of income, such as the
Theil measures, or the variance of logarithms, are quite sensitive to inequality at the bottom.
Although neither the conceptual issues nor the choice of inequality indicator are probably the
most important issues in the health literature, it should be noted that many of the indexes that are
used in the public health literature do not satisfy even the generally accepted axioms. For
example, the Robin Hood index (more usually known as the relative mean deviation), Kennedy
et al (1996), is unaffected by transfers between individuals on the same side of the mean. If a
transfer program were to transfer incomes from those just below the median to those near the
bottom, the Robin Hood index would not change, even though there would have been a real
reduction in inequality (and very likely a decrease in mortality risk too.) Perhaps most of the
public health work uses as its inequality measure the share of income accruing to the bottom x
(often 50) percent of the population. Once again, transfers within the bottom x percent, or within
the top   percent, will leave the measure unaffected, even though such transfers are capable 1x
of having a substantial effect on income inequality more broadly.
There has also been a good deal of discussion about the appropriate definition of household
income, and in particular the treatment of household size. A standard procedure in the economics35
literature is to “equivalize” household income by dividing income by some measure of household
size, either household size itself, or the number of equivalent adults, for example the number of
adults plus half the number of children, or the square root of the total number of people in the
household. Such per equivalent measures attempt to capture the resources available to each
person in the household, and recognize that, at the same level of income, members of a larger
household are worse off than members of a smaller household. (Even so, it should be noted that
there is some evidence, Elo and Preston, 1996, that, conditional on family income, larger family
size may not increase mortality.) When income inequality is calculated, it is also important that
equivalized income be assigned to individuals, and that inequality be calculated over persons, not
households. These apparently technical details can sometimes have serious effects on the
measurement of income inequality, and their treatment in the public health literature has often
been cavalier.
Conceptual problems are dwarfed by measurement problems. Income itself is hard to
measure, and the difficulties multiply when we try to measure income inequality. Measurement
error in income, even if it has little effect on the measurement of mean income, will inflate the
measured variance and measured income inequality. The measurement of income is sensitive to
survey design, particularly to the choice of the reference periods for income (longer reference
periods give lower measured inequality), and to exactly how the income question is asked. The
degree of disaggregation of income categories is important, as is whether incomes are reported as
a number, or in a set of predefined ranges such as less than $10,000, $10,000 to $20,000, and so
on, up to some open ended top category, such as more than $50,000. The choice of cutoff points
for the ranges is important, particularly the top band which effectively limits the highest income36
that can be reported. Some surveys permit people to report negative incomes (losses from busi-
ness activities) and some do not. Some surveys collect data on income, and some on consump-
tion; the latter is almost always less unequally distributed than the formal. The response rate from
surveys varies over space and time, and richer households are typically less likely to agree to
participate, in many cases because they live in communities where the enumerators cannot reach
them, see Groves and Couper (1998). In rich countries, and in some not so rich countries,
response rates have been falling over time, perhaps in response to the increasing competition
from market researchers. There are also differences across countries in the degree to which
people are prepared to cooperate with government surveys. Response rates in the US are typically
much higher in the US than in Western Europe.
Because different countries use different survey instruments, and have different survey
protocols, useful cross-country comparisons of income inequality require detailed knowledge of
the specific surveys. Similar issues sometimes arise with comparisons over time within one
country, even where the statistical service is of the highest quality. Specifically, the US Census
Bureau, in the summer of 2000, decided that the large increase in household income inequality
between 1992 and 1993, which it has previously presented as real, was in some unknowable part
due to changes in survey methodology, particularly changes in the highest level of income per-
mitted in the questionnaires, as well as the introduction of computer-aided interview technology,
Jones and Weinberg (2000). In consequence, the US no longer has a consistent continuous time
series of household income inequality. That the US is worse (as opposed to more transparent)
than other countries seems unlikely.
International data on income inequality come from a number of standard sources. Perhaps the37
best is the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) which contains information on the distributions of
disposable income for 25 (wealthy) countries over a period of 20 years, although not all countries
have data for all years, see Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000, pp. 273–4). The LIS permits access
to the micro data from broadly comparable income data for the covered countries. Note that the
underlying surveys do not use the same questionnaire, so that the comparability is not perfect, nor
are response rates the same for all countries. Nevertheless, the data are well-documented and
have been widely analyzed, so that their properties are well understood. Some authors have taken
income inequality data for industrialized countries from other, non-LIS sources, such as Sawyer
(1976); these are now superceded by the LIS.
Matters are a good deal more difficult for income distribution data from the large numbers of
developing countries that are not covered by the LIS. For many years, popular sources of income
distribution data were Jain (1975) and Paukert (1973), which are essentially compendia of
inequality estimates then available in the World Bank and International Labor Office, respect-
ively. In more recent years, research on international patterns of income inequality has been
transformed by the availability on the World Bank website of the inequality data assembled by
Deininger and Squire (DS) (1996). These data, which have seen widespread use, contain more
than 2,600 observations on gini coefficients (and many quintile shares) for more than 100
developed and developing countries for dates between 1947 and 1994. To be included in the DS
data set, estimates have to come from an identifiable source, be national in coverage, and be
based on either consumption or income. (Which comes from which is identified.) A subset of the
observations are labeled “high-quality” and these have been widely (and mostly uncritically) used
in a large number of papers, including papers on income inequality and health. Much of the high-38
quality data comes from industrialized countries, so that many researchers interested in develop-
ment have used at least some of the “non-recommended” data.
While DS’s data and documentation are a great improvement over what was previously avail-
able, they do not support the uncritical use that has been made of them, as shown in an important
study by Atkinson and Brandolini (1999). Atkinson and Brandolini focus their attention on the
subset of the DS data for the OECD countries, for which there are good, well-documented
surveys (including the LIS) which can be used for comparison. DS’s “high-quality” estimates do
not do well in this comparison, either across countries, or in some cases over time within
countries. For example, DS shows Sweden as one of the more unequal countries in the OECD,
with more income inequality than the UK, whereas in the LIS (as reported in Gottschalk and
Smeeding, 2000), Sweden has the lowest income inequality and the UK the highest apart from
the US. In some cases, such as Germany, the DS time series of inequality is quite different from
that computed directly from the surveys. Although the DS data may be more reliable for poor
countries than for rich, it is unlikely, especially since the poor countries contain a much larger
fraction of the data that are not endorsed by DS themselves.
We are currently in the position of not having any consistently reliable set of data on income
inequality outside the countries covered by the LIS. This is in spite of the existence of the 50 or
so surveys that have been collected under the aegis of the World Bank’s Living Standard
Measurement Survey (LSMS) which was set up in 1980 with the original purpose of generating
comparable data on income distribution for a wide range of countries. While the LSMS surveys
are broadly comparable, the questionnaires are not identical across surveys, and some have
differed a great deal. Nevertheless, a research program within the World Bank could be set up to39
use the LSMS surveys, together with the other unit-record data sets available, to generate a series
of inequality measures for which the quality guarantee could be based on a detailed analysis of
both survey protocols and the individual data.
Research on inequality and health has also used data on measures of inequality for areas
within countries. In principle, such measures are less problematic, if only because they are
usually calculated from national surveys using a uniform survey instrument so that, even if there
are errors, the patterns across areas may not be much affected. One problem is sample size,
especially for small areas. Inequality measures are usually less precisely estimated than means so
that, for example, the US Bureau of the Census publishes estimates of mean income by state
using the Current Population Survey, which has a sample size of around 50,000 households each
year. However, it publishes inequality measures by state only for three year moving averages.
Several developing countries also have regular, national household surveys that are large enough
to support considerable disaggregation; India, Indonesia, and Pakistan are examples. The Indian
National Sample Survey (NSS) collects detailed consumption data from more than 120,000
households every five years or so, and these surveys are designed to be representative for more
than 70 regions of the country. Yet even this survey does not support the measurement of income
inequality for districts, the level at which the Indian census publishes much of its data on child
mortality.
Most household surveys have a two-stage stratified design in which, at the first stage, primary
sampling units (PSUs) are randomly selected with probability proportional to population size.
These PSUs are typically small geographical units, such as villages or census tracts. Within each
PSU, the same number of households are selected so that, over the two stages together, each40
household in the population has an equal chance of being selected into the survey. In some
studies, investigators have calculated measures of local income inequality based on the house-
holds in each PSU. This procedure is obviously dangerous when there are only a few households
in each PSU and, even when this is not the case, respondents within PSUs are sometimes not
randomly selected, so that the relationship between the sample estimate and its population
counterpart cannot be assessed. Note too that PSUs are selected for statistical convenience, not
analytical meaning, and frequently do not correspond to any sensible definition of a community.
3.2 Cross-country studies of income inequality and health
Cross-country studies have played an important part in the literature on income inequality and
health. Preston’s (1975) seminal analysis looked at international patterns of GDP and life
expectancy, and it was on the basis of his findings that Preston suggested that there should be a
negative relationship between income inequality and health. Rodgers (1979) and Flegg (1982)
were early studies that followed Preston’s lead, explicitly looking for (and finding) effects of
income inequality on mortality. Rodgers used the Paukert (1973) data for 56 (unnamed) countries
and, controlling for income and other variables, found hazardous effects of inequality on life-
expectancy at birth, life-expectancy at age 5, and on the rate of infant mortality, with the last only
significant in the developed countries in the sample. Flegg (1982) looked only at child mortality,
and found significant effects of income inequality on child mortality in developing countries
using the Jain (1975) data. These authors, like Preston, thought of the nonlinearity in the
relationship between income and health as the basis for their results, and did not propose any
direct effect of income inequality at the microeconomic level. Such a direct effect was found in41
by Waldmann (1992) who used UN and World Bank sources, supplemented by income
inequality data from Jain (1975), to investigate infant mortality on a cross section of up to 57
developing and developed countries. As expected, he found that, conditional on mean income,
the share of income going to the poorest 20 percent of the population decreased infant mortality,
and more surprisingly, that the share of income going to the top 5 percent increased infant
mortality. This is a direct effect of inequality; the infant mortality rates among the poor increase
when the rich get richer, even when their own incomes do not suffer.
Perhaps the single most cited finding in the literature is Wilkinson’s (1992, 1994, 1996)
demonstration of a relationship between income inequality and life expectancy across a number
of industrialized countries, not only in levels but, more impressively, in changes over time.
Countries, such as France and Greece, that narrowed their income distributions by reducing
relative poverty, increased their life-expectancies, while those, such as the UK and Ireland,
whose income distributions widened, fell behind, Wilkinson (1996, Figure 5.4). Wilkinson
interprets these results as showing that, as countries become wealthier and move through the
epidemiological transition, the leading cause of differences in mortality moves from material
deprivation to social disadvantage. Material deprivation provokes poverty and infectious disease,
while social disadvantage provokes stress and chronic disease.
Later research has cast considerable doubt on the robustness and reliability of many of these
findings. As expected, one of the main difficulties lies in the unreliability of the data on income
inequality. For example, using the Deininger and Squire data, Gravelle, Wildman and Sutton
(2000) fail to replicate Rodgers (1979) results for developed and developing countries, while
Mellor and Milyo (2001) use a sample of 47 developing and developed countries in 1990 and42
find that the positive correlation between the gini coefficient and infant mortality vanishes once
secondary school enrolment is controlled for, while the negative correlation between income
inequality and life expectancy is eliminated by controlling for income per head. Mellor and
Milyo also fail to replicate Wilkinson’s results for developed economies. Although the DS data
have their own problems, the original results are clearly not robust. The same is true of
Waldmann’s findings; Baumbusch (1995) replicated Waldmann’s analysis using data of the same
vintage, but found that income accruing to the top 5 percent reduced infant mortality once the
data were updated from the 1993 edition of the World Bank’s World Development Report.
The single most important and careful study of the LIS countries is by Judge, Mulligan and
Benzeval (1997), who emphasize the poor quality of the data in previous work, and use the LIS
data in their own examination of life expectancy and infant mortality in Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. In these data, which are the best international data
currently available, the correlation between the gini coefficient and life expectancy is –0.17,
insignificantly different from zero, and neither the gini nor other measures of income inequality
are close to significance in any of the regressions explaining life expectancy. The situation is
somewhat different for infant mortality rates, where there is a significant positive (i.e. harmful)
effect of the ratio of the 90
th to the 10
th percentile. This measure of inequality exerts a significant
effect in several of the regressions, though it becomes insignificant when controls are added for
the negative effects on mortality of female labor force participation. In these data, the raw
correlation between infant mortality and inequality is driven largely by the US, which is very
unequal and has relatively high infant mortality.43
If these results are not entirely definitive, it is because the LIS data, although better than any
other, are neither fully comparable nor fully accurate. The debate between Wilkinson (1998) and
Judge, Mulligan and Benzeval (1998) has focused on differences in response rates across the LIS
surveys, and their possible effect on the results. It is also possible that, as with the difference
between infant mortality and life-expectancy, there will be links between specific causes at
specific ages and the plausibly associated measures of inequality, see for example McIsaac and
Wilkinson (1997). Yet, it is surely time to agree that there is currently no evidence that income
inequality drives life expectancy and general adult mortality within the industrialized countries. It
remains to be seen whether this means there is no relationship, or whether there is a relationship
that is being obscured by still inadequate data. Judgement on that depends a good deal on
whether there exists a relationship between income inequality and health in other contexts, on
which more below.
That, conditional on income, there should be a cross-country relationship between infant
mortality and income inequality, at least in poor countries, is both theoretically plausible, and
rather better supported by the (admittedly inadequate) data that are available. The plausibility
comes from recent work from the World Bank which, following the methodology pioneered by
Filmer and Pritchett (1999), has used Demographic and Health Surveys around the world to
construct a synthetic measure of wealth, which is then used to explain infant mortality rates, see
Gwatkin (2000) for an overview. The measure of wealth is an index based on the ownership of
various durable goods, and while the measure is undoubtedly correlated both with actual wealth
and income, we have no way of calibrating the transformation, and thus of using the results to
relate income to child health. Nevertheless, the results show very strong gradients in child health,44
with infant mortality rates heavily concentrated at the bottom of the distribution. Wagstaff (2000)
uses nine (mostly) LSMS surveys from developing countries to calculate child mortality rates by
quintile of equivalent consumption, and shows that child and infant mortality rates typically
decline most rapidly between the bottom and second quintile. Whether these results imply that
infant mortality rates are convex in income depends on the degree of convexity of the relation-
ship between income and the asset index, and on the density function of equivalent consumption,
but that infant mortality is concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution seems likely.
Yet there is also some evidence on the other side. In particular, Murthi, Guio, and Drèze (1995)
find very little effect of poverty on child mortality across districts in India once they control for
other factors, most importantly female literacy and urbanization.
To the extent that the DS data are accepted, there is a good deal of empirical evidence from
developing countries linking infant and child mortality to the DS measures of income inequality
conditional on the level of GDP per head and a range of other variables, for example in Pritchett
and Summers (1996), Filmer and Pritchett (1999) and Hales et al (1999). Whether this evidence
extends to adult mortality and life expectancy is difficult to know, not only because of the data
difficulties with income inequality, but because of the quality of the data on adult mortality. Few
poor countries have complete registration systems for deaths, so that good evidence on adult
mortality (or life expectancy at age 5, for example) is hard to come by for most developing
countries. In a few cases, such as India, there are sample registration surveys, and some data on
adult deaths can be gleaned from the Demographic and Health Surveys. But for most countries,
data on life expectancy are extrapolated from the data on infant mortality rates, and contain little
additional information. An exception to this generalization comes from the countries of Eastern45
Europe and the former Soviet Union, where life expectancy has been falling as income inequality
has increased (see Marmot and Bobak, 2000, Fig. 3, which shows a 12 countries correlation
coefficient of –0.63.) As is widely recognized, the Eastern European experience is difficult to
interpret because so much else has been going on, so that it is hard to isolate the effect of income
inequality.
Finally, there are a number of cross-country studies that link other health outcomes to income
inequality. Steckel (1995) finds a relationship between human stature (a measure of cumulative
nutritional status) and income inequality on a sample of developed and developing countries
using the income distribution from Jain (1975). Over (1999) looks across cities in the developing
world and finds that the US Census Bureau’s estimates of HIV infection rates are positively
related to the DS measures of countrywide income inequality. He interprets his findings in terms
of upper income men demanding the services supplied by lower income women, and these results
perhaps come closest to providing substance to Farmer’s (1999) contention that disease occurs
along the “fault lines” in the income distribution. Gaarder (2001) argues that income inequality is
likely to worsen the health consequences of pollution because the poor have lower baseline
health and are therefore more susceptible. She includes the gini coefficient in a meta-analysis of
previous estimated effects of particulate concentration on mortality at various sites around the
world and finds significant positive effects. Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2000) find a
significant relationship between DS gini coefficients and both homicide and robbery rates for a
group of 45 (for homicides) and 34 (for robberies) developed and developing countries. A good
deal of this is driven by Latin American countries, where both crime and inequality are very high.
Using data on 17 countries in the Americas, and gini coefficients from DS, Mujica et al (2000)46
confirm the positive correlation (0.55) between homicide and income inequality, but find a
negative correlation (–0.78) between suicide rates and income inequality.
3.3 Within country area studies of income inequality and health
As skepticism has grown about the international relationship between income inequality and
health, attention has switched to studies within countries, particularly of mortality and income
inequality across the states of the US. Two studies, by Kaplan et al (1996), and by Kennedy,
Kawachi, and Prothrow-Stith (1996a, b), both published in the British Medical Journal, and
inspired by Wilkinson’s (1992) cross-country work, found a relationship across the states
between various measures of income inequality and age-adjusted all cause mortality, as well as a
number of other measures, including infant mortality rates, deaths from cancer, coronary heart
disease, homicide, as well as disability, low birth weight, and crime. Kawachi and Kennedy
(1997) established that the results were robust to the choice of inequality indicator, while Lynch,
Kaplan and Pamuk (1998) extended the results to 282 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in
1990, finding that the loss of life from income inequality “is comparable to the combined loss of
life from lung cancer, diabetes, motor vehicle crashes, HIV infection, suicide, and homicide in
1995.” Kawachi, Kennedy and Prothrow-Stith (1997) argue that income inequality works by
reducing social capital, in particular the degree of trust between people, a (very poor) state-level
measure of which is constructed from the General Social Survey. Such an account is very much
in the spirit of stories of psychosocial stress within unequal social structures. In support of this
explanation, Wolfson et al (1999) estimate the degree of nonlinearity in the income to mortality
curve using the NLMS (as in Figure 2) and show that the effects of income inequality on state47
mortality rates are too large to be explained by the nonlinearity argument alone so that there must
be some direct effect of income inequality on individual mortality. The implications of these
results for economic policy have not gone unnoticed, see for example Kaplan and Lynch’s (2001)
editorial in the American Journal of Public Health entitled “Is economic policy health policy?”
These within nation results do not suffer from the same data problems as do the international
comparisons. Income inequality is usually measured from incomes collected in the census, which
is administered in the same form to all households in all states. Nor is there any question about
the existence of the correlation. Figure 8, taken from Deaton (2001) shows a typical scatter plot
between the log odds of age-adjusted mortality (the log of the ratio of the fraction dying to the
fraction not dying) on the vertical axis, and the variance of the logarithm of household income
per equivalent, with equivalents defined as 1 for adults and 0.5 for children aged 18 and less. The
District of Columbia is included as the 51
st state and, although it is an outlier in the sense of
having higher income inequality and higher mortality than any state, it lies along the regression
line defined by the other observations.
Nevertheless, there are serious questions about whether the correlation between income
inequality and mortality is robust through time, and whether it comes from the effects of income
inequality or some other factor that is correlated with it. Mellor and Milyo (2001) use data for the
48 continental states from five census years, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990, and reproduce
the strong hazardous effect of the gini coefficient on all cause mortality when only year dummies,
the age composition of the state, and median income are included as controls. The inclusion of
controls for the average level of education in each state eliminates the significance of the gini
coefficient and, once the authors include controls for the fractions of people in each state who are48
urbanized and who are black, the gini coefficient attracts a negative sign, though one that is not
significantly different from zero. Similar reversals are found for the fraction of births that are
low-birthweight while, over the five decades, there is no relationship across states between
deaths from cardiovascular disease, from malignant neoplasms, or from liver disease. Indeed, for
the first two, income inequality has a negative and significant relationship with deaths once
controls are entered for income, education, race, and urbanization. Only for homicides and, to a
lesser extent, infant mortality and deaths from accidents, is the gini coefficient a risk factor
conditional on the other controls. Mellor and Milyo also subject the hypothesis to a much more
stringent test, looking at the relationship between 10 and 20 year changes in mortality and the
corresponding changes in income inequality. This is perhaps too severe a test because it places a
great deal of weight on the timing of the link between income inequality and mortality. Even so,
it is worth noting that, with one exception, none of the income inequality to mortality relation-
ships survives the test. The exception is homicide, where the relationship with income inequality
is well-determined and holds over time as well as in the cross-section.
Related robustness issues are reported in my own work, Deaton (2001). A particular concern
is the pooling of data across racial or ethnic groups with different incomes and different mortality
rates. In the US, blacks have higher mortality rates than whites, and lower incomes, so that states
with a high fraction black tend to have higher mortality rates as well as higher income inequality.
As can be seen from Figure 8, such states tend to be predominately in the South where many
other special factors are likely to operate. If data are pooled for 1980 and 1990, the log odds of
age-adjusted mortality responds to the gini coefficient with a coefficient of 1.7 for males, and 1.1
for females. In the same regression, the mean of the logarithm of equivalized income reduces49
mortality for men, but barely significantly, and not at all for women. To illustrate the size of the
effect of inequality, the 1990 gini coefficients for Louisiana and New Hampshire were 0.47 and
0.40 respectively, which would account for a 12 percent difference in mortality rates, more than
half of the difference shown in Figure 8. 
If we now confine the calculations to white mortality alone, so that we no longer have the
mechanical effects described above, the coefficient on the gini drops to 1.1 for men and to 0.6 for
women, about a third lower than for all-race mortality. Nevertheless, these effects remain
significantly different from zero, and still show that inequality is a health hazard for the white
population. If we recalculate the gini coefficients so as to measure only inequality among whites,
the effects are further reduced, to 0.6 for men, and 0.4 for women, and only the former is
(marginally) significantly different from zero. This result means that the effect of inequality on
whites comes, not from the inequality of white incomes, but from the inequality between whites
and blacks, raising the suspicion that the effect has more to do with race than with income
inequality. Such a suspicion is borne out by controlling for the fraction of the population that is
black in each state. It turns out that a high fraction black raises mortality rates among both males
and females (note that these are whites) and that conditional on race, income inequality has no
effect on mortality. At this stage, it is unclear why the fraction black should exert such a strong
effect on white mortality (black mortality is also higher in states where there are relatively many
blacks), though it might be argued that it is itself some sort of marker for the inequality that
characterizes race relations in the US. Even so, the effect is not one that works through income
inequality; once the fraction black is included in the regression, the gini coefficient has no effect.
There is an obvious concern here that I have simply replaced one invalid variable, income50
inequality, with another, racial composition, and that both stand proxy for something else. This is
particularly the case with the state data, where there are at most 51 observations (or 102 observa-
tions if we pool data from 1980 and 1990), and where it would be easy to confound racial
composition (or income inequality) with geographical factors, especially given the peculiar role
of the South. Nevertheless, Deaton and Lubotsky (2001) show that the results carry through to
the 287 MSAs that can be consistently identified between 1980 and 1990. These data can be used
to replicate the findings of Lynch, Kaplan, and Pamuk (1998), and to show that, once again, the
inclusion of racial composition eliminates (and sometimes even reverses) the effect of income
inequality. And because there are so many more MSAs than states, it is possible to work within
regions, and to show that whether we look at cities in the South, or cities in other regions, and
conditioning on city average income, white mortality is higher in cities where the fraction of
blacks is higher.
Once the fraction black is controlled for, the cross-state and cross-city mortality results help
elucidate another puzzle, which is why there is such a strong relationship between income and
mortality in the individual data, and so little at the state or city data. Controlling for the fraction
black, the state or city mean logarithm of equivalized income has a significant negative effect on
mortality rates, particularly for men. Although the effects are not as large as in the individual
data, the results suggest that the differences might well be eliminated by controlling for a fuller
range of other factors.
Controlling for racial composition also makes the results consistent with the findings of Ross
et al (2000) who find that, in contrast to the US, there is no relation between income inequality
and mortality for the 10 provinces and 53 metropolitan areas of Canada, where race is not the51
salient issue that it is in the US. Yet that there should be no relationship across the states between
mortality and income inequality, either in the US or Canada, is surprising in light of the argu-
ments about nonlinearity. For Britain, there appears to be no area study on income inequality and
health, though Ben-Shlomo, White and Marmot (1996) find that mortality in the 8,464 wards of
England is affected not only by an index of deprivation based on household characteristics, but
also by the within-area dispersion of the deprivation index. Again, this is what is to be expected
if the deprivation measure is more closely linked to mortality among high deprivation people.
Chiang (1999) looks at mortality rates in the 21 counties and cities of Taiwan in 1976, 1985, and
1995 using household survey data to calculate measures of income and income inequality. He
finds strong protective effects of income in 1976 and 1985, and little effect of income inequality,
but finds that the situation is reversed in 1995, at which date income inequality is a hazard, and
income has no effect. Chiang interprets his findings as support for Wilkinson’s idea that income
is important at low levels of income, and income inequality at high levels of income which, as we
have seen, is also consistent with a nonlinear effect of income, and no direct influence of
inequality. Regidor et al (1997) find no relationship between (a nonstandard) measure of income
inequality and the prevalence of long-term disability across the 17 regions of Spain.
It is widely believed that there is a link between income inequality and crime (including
homicide) in the U.S. I have already noted Mellor and Milyo’s (2001) finding that homicide was
the only negative health outcome that was robustly linked to income inequality in their tests, and
such findings have consistently appeared in the literature since Ehrlich (1973), see Hsieh and
Pugh (1992) for an oft-quoted review and meta-analysis.
There appear to be few relevant studies from developing countries, even where it would be52
possible to do so, for example in the work on fertility and child mortality in India by Murthi,
Guio, and Drèze (1995) and Drèze and Murthi (2001). However, Drèze and Kheera (2000) find
that homicide rates across India are unrelated to measures of consumption inequality, but are
positively associated with the fraction of “missing” women. Although the authors do not make
the point, a link between homicide among men and the shortage of women invites a socio-bio-
logical explanation in terms of mating behavior. Pena, Wall and Person (2000) find that infant
mortality risks are higher among the poor, and higher still when the poor live in relatively
wealthy neighborhoods, which is consistent with a negative role for inequality. 
3.4 Studies of income inequality and health using individual data
Studies using individual level data face different data problems from either the national or the
area studies. Yet they have the advantage of being able to look for a direct effect of income
inequality without having to handle the effects of inequality that work through aggregation. But
there are compensating difficulties. Because mortality is a rare event, large sample sizes are
required to give enough deaths to reliably estimate mortality rates. At the same time, those few
health related surveys that follow people from interview to death are typically very poorly
endowed with economic information, including incomes. Nevertheless, there are several surveys
in the US that have been used to look at the determinants of mortality at the individual level. The
National Longitudinal Mortality Study starts from data collected in the Current Population
Survey, mostly around 1980, and then uses the National Death Index to check whether members
of responding households are dead by each follow up date. Currently, around 1.3 million people
have been tracked for up to a decade. In principle, the CPS provides excellent and detailed53
economic information, but many of the rounds used for the NLMS were not the March surveys,
when income data are collected, and so contain only rudimentary information on household
incomes.
There are two other US health surveys with later merges of death certificate data, the
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), which interviews around 50,000 households every
year, and the National Health and Nutritional Examination Survey (NHANES) the first round of
which surveyed more than 14,000 people between 1971 and 1975, for whom information on
deaths has been merged up to 1987. A final source of mortality data is the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), which has followed around 5,000 households (and their children and split-
offs) since 1968. Because this is a panel survey, returning regularly to each household, deaths are
reported by surviving family members. All four of these surveys have been used to look at the
relationship between mortality, income, and income mortality. 
Sweden also has a data set that works in same way as the NLMS in the US, though with even
more comprehensive data. Since 1975, Statistics Sweden has interviewed around 7,000 indivi-
duals each year in its Survey of Living Conditions, and these people have been linked, not only to
the national death statistics, but to income information from the national income tax statistics,
see Gerdtham and Johannesson (2001).
A second line of work has used, not mortality, but self-reported measures of health status.
The questions are included in a large number of surveys, if only because they are asked easily and
quickly. They ask respondents to rate their health on a five point scale from “poor,” to “fair”, to
“good” to “very good” and “excellent.” Many investigators convert this to a binary indicator of
poor health, corresponding to the “poor” and “fair” categories; such an indicator has been54
validated as a powerful predictor of subsequent morbidity and mortality, even conditional on a
physician’s examination, Idler and Benyamini (1997). These questions are included in the NHIS,
in the Behavioral and Risk Factor Surveillance Study (BRFSS) and, from 1995 onwards, in the
Current Population Survey.
The interpretation of the individual studies, and of the extent to which they support a link
from inequality to health depends a great deal on who is doing the interpreting. Nevertheless,
there is general agreement that the results from these studies are weaker and more ambiguous
than the area studies. For example, Lochner et al (2001), using the NHIS and merged mortality
data, find only a small effect of state income inequality on mortality (relative risk of living in the
top five most unequal states compared with the 10 most equal states of 1.12). This effect, which
is estimated with controls for family income and the state level poverty rate, is only statistically
significant for near-poor whites. Fiscella and Franks (1997) find no effect of PSU level inequality
on the probability of dying in the NHANES follow-up, but there are real questions about whether
their measure of inequality—the share of income accruing to the bottom 50 percent of the
population—can be adequately measured from the PSU data in the NHANES itself, within which
respondents are not randomly drawn. Daly et al (1998) find no effect of state level income
inequality on individual five year mortality rates using data from the PSID. As I shall explain in
more detail below, state level income inequality also has no detectable effect on individual
mortality in the NLMS.
Studies by Soobader and LeClere (1999) who use the NHIS with merged census county level
inequality data, Kennedy et al (1998) using the BRFSS merged with state level inequality data,
Fiscella and Franks (2000) using the NHIS, and Mellor and Milyo (1999) using the CPS with55
inequality data from the CPS at various geographical levels, all find some effects of income
inequality on self-reported morbidity. But the estimated effects are typically modest, and Mellor
and Milyo show that their effects are removed once controls are introduced for income and its
square, as well as for fixed state effects. (Note again that this last is a severe test; Mellor and
Milyo only have three years of CPS data, so they are effectively demanding a link between
changes in morbidity and changes in income distribution between 1995 and 1997). But LeClere
and Soobader (2001) also demonstrate considerable fragility in the results, showing that the
effects seem to work only for whites aged 18–44 in high inequality counties, and middle-aged
whites in very high inequality counties. There are no effects for other whites, nor for non-
Hispanic blacks.
I have already noted the paper by Wolfson et al (1999) showing that the degree of curvature
in the NLMS (Figure 2) is insufficient to explain the large effects of income inequality on
mortality at the state level. In Deaton (2001), I address more directly the role of state income
inequality on mortality in the NLMS. The NLMS distinguishes seven income groups, so that at
the first stage of the analysis, I use a logit model to estimate the log odds of dying during the 10
year follow up as a linear function of age including dummy variables for each of the seven
income groups. These logits are estimated for white males and females separately, using data
only for those aged 18 to 75 at the time of first interview. (The log odds of mortality is approx-
imately linear in age over this range.) In order to conduct a state level analysis, each of these
models is fitted to data for a single state, thus allowing inequality—or any other state level
effect—an unrestricted effect on the relationship between mortality and income. The first-stage
produces numbers for each state like the points shown as circles in Figure 1 so that, at the second56
stage, it is possible to examine whether these points are higher in states where income inequality
is higher. Note that this two-stage procedure is as general as a single stage model in which
individual mortality is linked to state level data on income inequality.
My original concern was to test the model of relative deprivation presented in Section 2.5.2
above. This was done by comparing the effects of each income group in each state with the
predicted values from computing a relative deprivation curve as illustrated in Figure 7. Within
states, the relative deprivation story does well, outperforming a simple model in which income
itself accounts for the differences across income groups. However, the relative deprivation model
accounts for essentially none of the variation in mortality across states which, given the theory,
means that the gini coefficient does not predict interstate mortality differences in the NLMS data.
This finding is supported (even without controls for income) using the 1.3 million observations
in the full NLMS. Table 13 in Rogot et al (1992) shows no correlation across the states between
age adjusted mortality and income inequality, a finding that is in direct contradiction with Figure
9 and with the findings listed at the outset of Section 3.4 above. This contradiction is resolved (at
least in part) by the demonstration that, in these individual level data as in the aggregate state-
level data, the fraction black in each state is a powerful predictor of white mortality.
Once again, there is no direct effect of income inequality. Because the racial composition of
states is such a strong predictor of mortality in the aggregate state-level and MSA data, as well as
in the individual data from the NLMS, it would be interesting to discover whether the Lochner et
al (2001) findings on mortality in the NHIS follow-up can also be attributed to racial composi-
tion; given their partition of states into inequality groups, it seems likely.
Taking income and mortality together, the Swedish data used by Gerdtham and Johanesson57
(2001) are probably of higher quality than anything currently available in the US. Gerdtham and
Johanesson use the 284 municipalities of Sweden as their communities, and examine individual
mortality for 41,006 individuals aged between 20 and 84 who were interviewed between 1980
and 1986 and whose mortality was followed-up until the end of 1996. Mortality is assessed
relative to individual income, community income, and community income inequality, with the
latter two measured from the survey data itself, a procedure which is subject to the reservations
raised above. As in all similar studies, individual income is strongly protective, even allowing for
education and a host of other variables, including initial health status, but neither inequality nor
mean community income appeared to have any effect. The last result is evidence against the
relative income hypothesis so that, once again, we are led back to the original model in which
health is an increasing nonlinear function of absolute income.
3.5 Inequality and mortality decline in the US and Britain
A final source of evidence comes from examining whether the increase in income inequality in
the 1980s in both Britain and the U.S. can be linked to mortality. Wilkinson (1996) argues that
for Britain, mortality rates for infants and for young adults fell less rapidly after 1985 than would
have been the case had income inequality remained constant. Figure 5.10 of Wilkinson (1996,
page 97) plots a time series of mortality, not only of infants, but also of children and young
adults, and shows that the sum of age-adjusted mortality rates fell less rapidly after 1985 than it
did in the decade from 1975 to 1985. These findings, together with the corresponding evidence
for the U.S. have recently been examined in Deaton and Paxson (2001b). Their results are as
follows.58
There were large increases in income inequality in both Britain and the U.S. in the 1970s and
1980s. In both countries, inequality in family and household income increased from the early or
mid-1970s until around 1990, with (arguably) little increase but certainly no decline since. By the
early to mid 1980s, inequality had risen to new postwar highs and continued to increase, at least
until 1990. As pointed out by Wilkinson, the rate of decline of infant mortality was particularly
rapid in the decade from 1975 to 1985, and less rapid thereafter. The same is true in the US,
though the period of rapid decline starts somewhat earlier, in the late 1960s, and finishes earlier,
around 1980. In both countries, the rate of decline of mortality rates among young adults has
slowed steadily, and by 1985 mortality rates are either flat or actually rising. For infants and
young adults taken together, the rate of mortality decline has therefore been a good deal slower in
recent years than in the period before the increase in income inequality.
Even so, it is unlikely that income inequality has much to do with these mortality trends.
First, the episodes of rapid decline in the infant mortality rate are episodes, not trends. Prior to
the periods of rapid decline in each country, progress was slower, with a rate of decline compar-
able to that after the end of the episode. Yet income inequality was not high prior to the onset of
the rapid decline, so that in neither country since 1950 has there been a consistent relationship
between income inequality and the rate of decline of infant mortality. Second, we know a good
deal about the causes of the decline in infant mortality, much of which can be attributed to
declines in perinatal mortality through new techniques for preventing the deaths of low-birth
weight babies. These techniques diffused more quickly in the US than in the UK, so that the
rapid decline in mortality started first in the US and its possibilities were more rapidly exhausted
there. There seems no reason other than coincidence to link the timing of this exhaustion to the59
rise in income inequality. Third, among young adults, much of the increase in mortality is
attributable to HIV/AIDS, for which the rise in income inequality in the mid-1980s is not the
cause. Finally, if we look at mortality rates of adults aged 45 and above, there is a period of
unusually rapid mortality decline (particularly although not exclusively for men) that began
around 1970 (again a little earlier in the US), and continues to the present. So if income inequ-
ality is hazardous for the young, it is protective for their elders! Once again, a more convincing
explanation lies in the increased use, first in the US and later in Britain, of life-saving technolo-
gies for dealing with cardiovascular disease, angioplasty, coronary artery bypass grafts, and the
use of clotbusting drugs and even aspirin. 
4. Summary and conclusions
The stories about income inequality affecting health are stronger than the evidence. Judging by
the explosion of interest and of citations, there is a strong appeal to the idea that, before the
epidemiological transition, income determines mortality while, after it, income inequality
determines mortality. That in poor countries, income protects against poor sanitation, unhealthy
working and living environments, poor nutrition, and a plethora of infectious diseases. That in
rich countries, where these evils are but distant memories, income inequality is an indicator of
the quality of social arrangements, of stress, and of mortality. Yet, as we have seen, even if it is
true that, at higher income levels, income inequality becomes more important as a cause of death,
there is no need to assume that the relationship between income and mortality changes with
economic development. If it is poverty, not inequality, that drives mortality, so that income has a
much bigger effect on health at low than high incomes, average income will eventually cease to60
be associated with poor health, while the effects of inequality will endure for much longer
because, even in rich economies, there are some who are not so rich. Income inequality will
continue to affect mortality until everyone ceases to be poor, which happens long after average
income has risen out of the range of poverty.
But it is not true that income inequality is a major determinant of population health. There is
no robust correlation between life-expectancy and income inequality among the rich countries,
and the correlation across the states and cities of the US is almost certainly the result of some-
thing that is correlated with income inequality, but that is not income inequality itself. The rapid
increases in income inequality in the 1980s have not been associated with any slowdown in the
rate of mortality decline. Studies of individual mortality and income inequality show no link,
except for one survey where the estimated effects are small and are confined to one population
group. Infant and child mortality in developing countries is primary a consequence of poverty so
that, conditional on average income, income inequality is important only because, given average
income, inequality is effectively a measure of poverty. But it is low incomes that are important,
not inequality, and there is no evidence that making the rich richer, however undesirable that may
be on other grounds, has any effect on the health of the poor or their children, provided that their
own incomes are maintained. The only exception to these generalizations is perhaps the case of
homicide, where income inequality itself appears to play a genuine role.
These conclusions are not different from those of earlier commentators, particularly Judge
(1995), Judge, Mulligan and Benzeval (1997) and Doorslaer and Wagstaff (1999). Yet they must
not be misinterpreted. They do not imply that the social environment is not important for indi-
vidual health, let alone that individual health is determined by individual characteristics and the61
provision of personal medical care. We know from Whitehall and from other studies that
positions in hierarchies matter, perhaps through an ability to control one’s life, but in any case
through some mechanism that works through relationships with other human beings. My own
empirical results have drawn attention to another social factor, the effects of racial composition
on mortality, something that remains to be fully investigated. And I have emphasized several
other cases where reductions in deprivation in one dimension, whether it be land ownership,
democratic rights, women’s agency, or income, will bring benefits not only in and of themselves,
but also to the relief from other deprivations, in this case particularly the deprivation of ill-health.
This is of course Sen’s (1999) theme in Development and Freedom, that relief from any one of a
number of interlinked deprivations, each of which is an important unfreedom in its own right,
helps promote relief from the others. This is quite different from a story in which income
inequality is the principal actor and main villain.
My conclusions carry a number of implications for the direction of future research. The most
obvious is that attention should be directed away from further attention to income inequality per
se. I have already emphasized the puzzling role of racial composition on mortality in the US,
about which nothing is understood. More generally, the urgent need is to refocus research to
investigate the role that income plays in promoting health. We need to know much more than we
do about whether the effects of income come from income itself, or from correlates, such as
education, wealth, control, or rank. We need to know why income is so important in the
individual level studies, and so apparently unimportant at the aggregate level. If income is indeed
directly protective, we need to know whether the effect is really nonlinear and by how much,
because it is this, and not any direct effect of income inequality on health, that determines62
whether and by how much income redistribution can improve population health.
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Appendix: Income, income inequality and mortality in economic development
In Section 2.1.1, I used a simple quadratic version of the absolute income hypothesis to illustrate
how income and income inequality were likely to have different effects on population health at
different levels of average income. The quadratic model is useful, but not very plausible, if only
because increases in income will eventually reduce health. A more realistic model links
individual health to a latent variable, itself a function of income, and assumes that death takes
place when this latent variable falls below some critical value. Under suitable assumptions, such
a formulation yields explicit predictions for the probability of death for individuals, as well as for
communities, and the resulting equations provide a better way of linking population health to
population income and income inequality.
As before, I write   for the health of individual i in population s, and assume that health is his
linear in the logarithm of individual income,
where the random term   is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance is
 The individual dies when   falls below the critical level c. The probability that this 2. his
happens, or the probability of death, is written   which is pis70
his    µs   (lnyisµs)  is (12)
ps  p(death |µs)  
cµs
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where  is the distribution function of the standard normal. Suppose that, within each country s,
the logarithm of income is normally distributed with mean   and variance  We can then µs vs.
rewrite (10) as
so that  , the fraction of people dying in the state, or the probability of death conditional on the ps
state mean of log income can be written
Equation (13) links population mortality rates to the population mean of log income,  and the µs,
variance of log income, vs.
If we differentiate, first with respect to  , and then with respect to  we obtain µs vs,
and
where  is the pdf of the standard normal. As mean log income   goes to infinity, the pdf goes µs
to zero, so that the derivative in (14) goes to zero when income is sufficiently large. The same is
true for the derivative with respect to income inequality in (15) because   goes to zero as x (x)x
goes to infinity. As countries become sufficiently rich, neither population mean income nor
income inequality have any effect on population mortality rates. However, if we take the ratio of
(15) to (16), the pdf functions cancel, and the ratio grows linearly and indefinitely with mean log71
income. Hence, as claimed, the effect of income inequality relative to the effect of income is














































Figure 1: Age adjusted log odds of mortality and the logarithm of family
income, National Longitudinal Mortality Study











































Figure 2: Age adjusted probability of death and family income,











Figure 3: Health and income in two reference groups: the effects of
within- and between-group inequality on the gradient























































logarithm of household total expenditure per head
boys
girls
Figure 4: Percentages of children aged 7 to 12 who are enrolled in































Percentage of children aged 0 to 4 with all three
of BCG, DPT, and OPV immunizations
Figure 5: Percentages of children under 5 who are vaccinated, rural



















































COMPUTING RELATIVE DEPRIVATION FROM THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Figure 6: The definition of relative deprivation from the cumulative
distribution of incomeCPS total hh income
























































Figure 7: Relative deprivation curves for selected US states, Current
Population Survey 1991.
















































Figure 8: Inequality and the log odds of mortality, vital statistics and
census data, 1990